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Abstract
We introduce two new “degree of complementarity” measures, which we refer to, respectively, as
supermodular width and superadditive width. Both are formulated based on natural witnesses of com-
plementarity. We show that both measures are robust by proving that they, respectively, characterize
the gap of monotone set functions from being submodular and subadditive. Thus, they define two new
hierarchies over monotone set functions, which we will refer to as Supermodular Width (SMW) hierarchy
and Superadditive Width (SAW) hierarchy, with foundations — i.e. level 0 of the hierarchies — resting
exactly on submodular and subadditive functions, respectively.
We present a comprehensive comparative analysis of the SMW hierarchy and the Supermodular De-
gree (SD) hierarchy, defined by Feige and Izsak. We prove that the SMW hierarchy is strictly more
expressive than the SD hierarchy. In particular, we show that every monotone set function of supermod-
ular degree d has supermodular width at most d, and there exists a supermodular-width-1 function over
a ground set of m elements whose supermodular degree is m− 1. We show that previous results regard-
ing approximation guarantees for welfare and constrained maximization as well as regarding the Price
of Anarchy (PoA) of simple auctions can be extended without any loss from the supermodular degree
to the supermodular width. We also establish almost matching information-theoretical lower bounds
for these two well-studied fundamental maximization problems over set functions. The combination of
these approximation and hardness results illustrate that the SMW hierarchy provides not only a natural
notion of complementarity, but also an accurate characterization of “near submodularity” needed for
maximization approximation. While SD and SMW hierarchies support nontrivial bounds on the PoA
of simple auctions, we show that our SAW hierarchy seems to capture more intrinsic properties needed
to realize the efficiency of simple auctions. So far, the SAW hierarchy provides the best dependency for
the PoA of Single-bid Auction, and is nearly as competitive as the Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs
(MPH) hierarchy for Simultaneous Item First Price Auction (SIA). We also provide almost tight lower
bounds for the PoA of both auctions with respect to the SAW hierarchy.
1 Introduction
For a ground set X = [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, a set function f : 2X → R assigns each subset S ⊆ X a real
value.1 Function f is monotone if f(T ) ≥ f(S),∀S ⊆ T ⊆ X, and normalized if f(∅) = 0. In this paper, we
will focus on normalized monotone set functions, which by definition are non-negative.
Like graphs to network analysis, set functions provide the mathematical language for many applications,
ranging from combinatorial auctions (economics) to coalition formation (cooperative game theory; political
science) [24, 25] to influence maximization (viral marketing) [23, 16]. Because of its exponential dimension-
ality, set functions — which are as rich as weighted hypergraphs — are far more expressive mathematically
and challenging algorithmically than graphs [27]. However, when monotone set functions are submodular
1Throughout the paper we use m to denote the number of elements in the ground set.
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[21, 28] or — more generally — complement-free [7], algorithms with remarkable performance guarantees
have been developed for various optimization, social influence, economic, and learning tasks [2, 16, 19, 3, 22].
In this paper, we study two new degree-of-complementarity measures of monotone set functions, and
demonstrate their usefulness for several optimization and economic tasks. We prove that our complementarity
measures — which are based on natural witnesses of complementarity — introduce hierarchies (over monotone
set functions) that smoothly move beyond submodularity and subadditivity.
1.1 Witnesses to Complementarity: Supermodular Sets and Superadditive Sets
For any sets S, T ⊆ X, let f(S|T ) := f(S∪T )−f(T ) be the margin of S given T . Recall that f is subadditive
if f(S ∪ T ) ≤ f(S) + f(T ), ∀S, T ⊆ X, and submodular if for all S, T and v ∈ X \ T , f(v|S ∪ T ) ≤ f(v|S).
It is well known that every submodular set function is also subadditive.
If there are sets S, T ⊆ V such that f(S ∪ T ) > f(S) + f(T ), then one may say that (S, T ) is a witness
to complementarity in monotone set function f . Motivated by a line of recent work [1, 13, 9, 8, 10, 5], we
consider the following fundamental question about set functions:
Are there other natural, and preferably more general, forms of witnesses to complementarity that
have algorithmic consequences?
The supermodular degree of Feige and Izsak [9] is among the first measures of complementarity that are
connected with algorithmic solutions to monotone-set-function maximization and combinatorial auctions.
The supermodular degree is defined based on a notion of positive dependency between elements: u ∈ X
positively depends on v ∈ X\{u} (denoted by u→+ v), if there exists S ⊆ X such that f(u|S) > f(u|S\{v}).
Definition 1 (Supermodular Degree). The supermodular degree of a set function f : 2X → R+, SD(f), is
defined to be SD(f) = maxu∈X |Dep+f (u)|, where Dep+f (u) = {v|u→+ v}.
Although supermodular degree has been shown useful in a number of settings, it is not clear whether it
provides the tightest possible characterization of supermodularity. For example, consider a customer who
wants any two or more items out of m items, but not zero or one item. That is, the customer has a valuation
function, where any subset of [m] of size at least 2 provides utility 1, and any subset of size at most 1 provides
utility 0. For this function, according to Feige and Izsak’s definition, any two items depend positively on
each other. In particular, any item depends positively on all other items, so the supermodular degree of this
valuation function is m− 1 — the largest degree possible. This seems to contradict the intuition that there
is only very limited complementarity.
Below, we will provide two perspectives, with the first highlighting supermodularity and the second
highlighting superadditivity. In the rest of the paper, we will study how these two complementarity measures
can be used to capture the performance of basic computational solutions in optimization and auction settings
where the utilities are modeled by monotone set functions. In particular, our measure of supermodularity
refines supermodular degree, and avoids the kind of overestimation discussed above.
Our first definition focuses on modularity:
Definition 2 (Supermodular Set). Given a normalized monotone set function f over a ground set X, a set
T ⊆ X is supermodular w.r.t. f if
∃S ⊆ X and v ∈ X \ T, such that: f(v|S ∪ T ) > max
T ′(T
f(v|S ∪ T ′).
First note that if f is submodular, then f(v|S∪T ) ≤ f(v|S∪T ′),∀T ′ ( T , implying f has no supermodular
set. Thus, if a set function f has a supermodular set, then it is not submodular.
We say that such a set T (in Definition 2) complements item v given S. In other words, S provides
the setting that demonstrates the complementarity between v and T . In the customer example given after
Definition 1, we can easily check that any singleton is a supermodular set, but any set with size at least
two is not a supermodular set, because any single item in the set already provides all the complementarity
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for any other single item. A supermodular set behaves similarly to the typical example of complements,
namely complementary bundles,2 in the sense that the set as a whole provides more complement to a single
item than any of its strict subsets. However, supermodular sets have richer structures while preserving the
strong complementarity of such bundles, making them potentially more challenging to deal with mathemat-
ically/algorithmically than complementary bundles of a similar size.
Our next definition focuses on additivity:
Definition 3 (Superadditive Set). Given a normalized monotone set function f over a ground set X, a set
T ⊆ X is superadditive w.r.t. f if
∃S ⊆ X \ T such that: f(S|T ) > max
T ′(T
f(S|T ′).
In Definition 3, we say such a set T complements set S. Note that if f is subadditive, then for T ′ = ∅,
f(S|T ) = f(S ∪ T )− f(T ) ≤ (f(S) + f(T ))− f(T ) = f(S) = f(S)− f(T ′) = f(S|T ′), implying f does not
have a superadditive set. In other words, if f has any superadditive set, then it is not subadditive.
Supermodular/superadditive sets correspond to witnesses that exhibit different kinds of complementarity.
Supermodular sets are sensitive to the presence of an environment, and superadditive sets model complements
to sets instead of items. The cardinality of the largest supermodular sets or superadditive sets provides a
measure of the “level of complementarity”, similar to the supermodular degree ([9]), the size of the largest
bundle, and the hyperedge size ([8]) (also see Definition 11) in previous work.
Definition 4 (Supermodular Width). The supermodular width of a set function f is defined to be
SMW(f) := max{|T | | T is a supermodular set w.r.t. f}.
Definition 5 (Superadditive Width). The superadditive width of a set function f is defined to be
SAW(f) := max{|T | | T is a superadditive set w.r.t. f}.
Each measure classifies monotone set functions into a hierarchy of m levels:
Definition 6 (Supermodular Width Hierarchy (SMW-d)). For any integer d ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1}, a set function
f : 2[m] → R belongs to the first d-levels of the supermodular width hierarchy, denoted by f ∈ SMW-d, if
and only if SMW(f) ≤ d.
Definition 7 (Superadditive Width Hierarchy (SAW-d)). For any integer d ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1}, a set function
f : 2[m] → R belongs to the first d levels of the superadditive width hierarchy, denoted by f ∈ SAW-d, if and
only if SAW(f) ≤ d.
We will show that functions at level 0 of the above two hierarchies, respectively, are precisely the families
of submodular and subadditive functions. In both hierarchies, SMW-(m − 1) and SAW-(m − 1) contains
all monotone set functions over m elements. Coming back to the customer example again, we see that the
utility of the customer has supermodular width of 1. Comparing to its supermodular degree of m − 1, our
hierarchy characterizes this utility function at a much lower level, which matches our intuition that the
complementarity of this customer’s utility function should be limited. We will further show below that this
difference would also have significant algorithmic implications.
1.2 Our Results and Related Work
We now summarize the technical results of this paper. Structurally, we provide strong evidence that our
definitions of supermodular/superadditive sets are natural and robust. We show that they — respectively —
capture a set-theoretical gap of monotone set functions to submodularity and subadditivity. Algorithmically,
we prove that our characterization based on supermodular width is strictly stronger than that of Feige-Izsak’s
based on supermodular degree, by establishing the following:
2S is a complementary bundle if f(S) > 0 and maxS′(S f(S
′) = 0.
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1. For every set function f : 2[m] → R, SD(f) ≤ SMW(f), and there exists a function whose supermodular
degree is much larger than its supermodular width.
2. The SMW hierarchy offers the same level of algorithmic guarantees in the maximization and auction
settings as the SD hierarchy.
We will also compare both hierarchies with the MPH hierarchy of [8].
1.2.1 Robustness: Capturing the Set-Theoretical Gap to Submodularity/Subadditivity
We interpret the level of complementarity in our formulation of supermodular and superadditive sets from a
dual perspective: We prove that they characterize the gaps from a monotone set function to submodularity
and subadditivity, respectively. Our characterization uses the following definition.
Definition 8 (d-Scopic Submodularity). For integer d ≥ 0, a normalized monotone set function f is d-scopic
submodular if and only if,
f(v|T ) ≤ max
T ′:T ′⊆T,|T ′|≤d
f(v|S ∪ T ′), ∀S, T ⊆ X, v ∈ X satisfying S ⊆ T, v /∈ T (1)
Note that in Condition (1), the family {S ∪ T ′|T ′ ⊆ T, |T ′| ≤ d} defines a set-theoretical neighborhood
around S. Our definition of d-scopic submodularity means that even if the submodular condition f(v|T ) ≤
f(v|S) may not hold for some S ⊆ T , it holds for some set in S’s d-neighborhood inside T . Thus, the
parameter d provides a set-theoretical scope for examining submodularity.
Similarly, we define:
Definition 9 (d-scopic Subadditivity). For integer d ≥ 0, a set function f is d-scopic subadditive if and
only if,
f(S|T ) ≤ max
T ′:T ′⊆T, |T ′|≤d
f(S|T ′), ∀S, T ⊆ X satisfying S ∩ T = ∅. (2)
In Section 2, we prove the following two theorems.
Theorem 1 (Set-Theoretical Characterization of the SMW Hierarchy). For any integer d ≥ 0 and set
function f : 2X → R, f is d-scopic submodular if and only if SMW(f) ≤ d.
Theorem 2 (Set-Theoretical Characterization of the SAW Hierarchy). For any integer d ≥ 0 and set
function f : 2X → R, f is d-scopic subadditive if and only if SAW(f) ≤ d.
With matching supermodularity/submodularity and superadditivity/subadditivity characterization, The-
orems 1 and 2 illustrate that our definitions of supermodular/superadditive sets are both natural and robust.
We note that while monotone submodular functions are all subadditive, some d-scopic submodular functions
are not d-scopic subadditive. As shown in Propositions 2.4 and 2.5, these two hierarchies are not compa-
rable. We will show that they model different aspects of complementarity that can be utilized in different
algorithmic and economic settings.
1.2.2 Expressiveness: Strengthening Supermodular Degree
We will show that our characterization based on supermodular width strengthens Feige-Izsak’s the character-
ization based on supermodular degree [9]. The statement has two parts. We first prove, that supermodular
sets extend positive dependency (as used in supermodular degree), which — in essence — can be viewed as
a graphical approximation of supermodular sets.
Theorem 3. Every monotone set function f with supermodular degree d has supermodular width at most
d (i.e., it is d-scopic submodular). Moreover, there exists a monotone set function f : 2[m] → R+ with
SMW(f) = 1 and SD(f) = m− 1.
In other words, the SMW hierarchy strictly dominates the SD hierarchy. 3
3Formally, when comparing two set-function hierarchies, say with name {Yd}d∈[0,m−1] and {Zd}d∈[0,m−1], we say Y domi-
nates Z, if for all d ∈ [0,m− 1] and f , f ∈ Zd implies f ∈ Yd.
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1.2.3 Usefulness: Algorithmic and Economic Applications
We then show, algorithmically, the SMW hierarchy — while being more expressive than the SD hierarchy
— is almost as useful as the latter (Theorems 8, 10 and 19).
We will illustrate the usefulness of our hierarchies in algorithm and auction design with two archetypal
classes of problems, set function maximization and combinatorial auctions, which traditionally involve mea-
sures of complementarity. Motivated by previous work [9, 13, 10, 8], we will characterize the approximation
guarantee of polynomial-time set-function maximization algorithms and efficiency of simple auction protocols
in terms of the complementarity level in our hierarchies. In these settings, we will compare our hierarchies
with two most commonly cited complementarity hierarchies: the supermodular degree (SD) hierarchy and
the Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy.
• Set-Function Maximization We will consider both constrained and welfare maximization. The former
aims to find a set of a given cardinality with maximum function value. The latter aims to allocate a
set of items to n agents, 4 with potentially different valuations, such that the total value of all agents
is maximized. As a set function has exponential dimensions in m, in both maximization problems, we
assume that the input set functions are given by their value oracles.
• Combinatorial Auctions and Simple Auction Protocols We will consider two well-studied simple com-
binatorial auction protocols: Single-bid Auction and Simultaneous Item First Price Auction (SIA). In
both settings, there are multiple agents, each of which has a (potentially different) valuation function
over subsets of items. The former auction protocol proceeds by asking each bidder to bid a single price,
and letting bidders, in descending order of their bids, buy any available set of items paying their bid
for each item. The latter simply runs first-price auctions simultaneously for all items.
Approximation Guarantees According to Supermodular Widths
We will prove that the elegant approximability results for constrained maximization by [13] and for welfare
maximization by [9] can be extended from supermodular degree to supermodular width. We obtain the same
dependency (see Theorems 8 and 10) — that is, 1− e−1/(d+1) and 1d+2 respectively — on the supermodular
width d as what the supermodular degree previously provides for these problems.
Because our SMW hierarchy is strictly more expressive, our upper bounds for SMW-d cover strictly
more monotone set functions than previous results for SD-d. We will also complement our algorithmic
results with nearly matching information theoretical lower bounds (see Theorems 9 and 11), for these two
well-studied fundamental maximization problems. Our approximation and hardness results illustrate that
the SMW hierarchy not only captures a natural notion of complementarity, but also provides an accurate
characterization of the “nearly submodular property” needed by approximate maximization problems.
Efficiency of Simple Auctions According to Superadditive/Supermodular Width
Next, we will analyze the efficiency of two well-known simple auction protocols in terms of superadditive
width. To state our results and compare them with previous work, we first recall a notation from [8]:
Definition 10 (Closure under Maximization). For any family of set functions F over X, the closure of F
under maximization, denoted by max(F), is the following family of set functions: f ∈ max(F) if and only if
∃k ∈ N, f1, . . . , fk ∈ F , s.t. f(S) = max
i∈[k]
fi(S),∀S ⊆ X.
We will prove the following:
Theorem 4. Single-bid Auction and SIA are approximately efficient — with Price of Anarchy (PoA)
O(d logm) — for valuation functions in max(SAW(d)).
4Throughout the paper we use n to denote the number of agents (whenever applicable) unless otherwise specified.
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SD-d MPH-(d+ 1) SMW-d SAW-d
constrained
maximization
1− e1/(d+1)
[13]
?
1− e1/(d+1)
(Thm 8)
?
welfare
maximization
1/(d+ 2) [9] 1/(d+ 2) [8]
1/(d+ 2)
(Thm 10)
?
PoA of Single-bid
Auction
O(d2 logm)
[10]
?
O(d2 logm)
(Thm 18)
O(d logm)
(Thm 14)
PoA of SIA O(d) [8] O(d) [8]
O(d2 logm)
(Thm 19)
O(d logm)
(Thm 15)
Table 1: Comparison of hierarchies of complementarity. Note that the O(d) bound for PoA of SIA with
SD-d valuations follows from the fact that SD-d ⊆ MPH-(d + 1), which is not clearly comparable with the
PoA bound of SIA with SMW-d valuations. See corresponding references and theorems for more accurate
statements.
We will also complement our PoA results by almost tight (up to a factor of O(logm)) lower bounds:
Theorem 5. For any d > 0, there is an instance with SAW-d valuations, where the Price of Stability (PoS)
of Single-bid Auction is at least d+ 1− ε for any ε > 0, and the PoA of SIA is at least d.
Although supermodular width strictly strengthens supermodular degree, superadditive width is not com-
parable with supermodular degree. Nevertheless, our PoA bound of O(d logm) is a factor of d tighter than
the O(d2 logm) supermodular-degree based bound of [10] for Single-bid Auction. This improvement of de-
pendency on d, together with the nearly matching lower bound, suggests that the SAW hierarchy might
be more capable in capturing the smooth transition of efficiency of simple auctions. Furthermore, as a
byproduct of our efficiency results for the SAW hierarchy, we also obtain similar results, but with a worse
dependency on d, for the SMW hierarchy.
Theorem 6. Single-bid auction and SIA are approximately efficient — with PoA O(d2 logm) — for valua-
tions in max(SMW-d∩SUPADD), where SUPADD denotes the class of monotone superadditive set functions.
For Single-bid Auction, this result strengthens the central efficiency result of [10] by replacing the super-
modular degree with the more inclusive supermodular width. For the PoA analysis of SIA, the the Maximum
over Positive Hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy of [8] remains the gold standard, by providing asymptotically
matching upper and lower bounds. MPH is defined based on the following hypergraph characterization of
set functions: Every normalized monotone set function over ground set X can be uniquely expressed by
another set function h such that f(S) =
∑
T⊆S h(T ),∀S ⊆ X, where h(T ) for each T is called the weight of
hyperedge T .
Definition 11 (Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs [8]). Let PH-d be the class of set functions whose
hypergraph representation h satisfies: (1) h(S) ≥ 0 for all S, and (2) h(S) > 0 only if |S| ≤ d. The d-th
level of the MPH hierarchy is defined as MPH-d = max(PH-d).
MPH provides the best characterization to the efficiency of SIA as well as ties with SD and SMW regarding
the approximation ratio of welfare maximization (although it requires access to the much stronger demand
oracles). However, it remains open whether it can be used to analyze constrained set function maximization
and Single-bid Auction. See Table 1 for a comparison.
We will prove the following theorem which states that, in general, the SAW hierarchy is not comparable
with MPH.
Theorem 7. There is a subadditive function that lives in an upper (i.e. ≥ m/2) MPH level. On the other
direction, there is a function on level 2 of MPH, whose superadditive and supermodular widths are both m−1.
It remains open whether MPH-(d + 1) — which subsumes SD-d as a subset — contains SMW-d. In
particular, the proof that SD-d ⊆ MPH-(d+ 1) in [8] does not appear easily applicable to SMW-d.
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1.2.4 Other Related Work
Set Function Maximization
There is a rich body of research focusing on set function maximization with complement-free functions,
e.g. [21, 28, 7]. Various information/complexity theoretical lower bounds have been established for both
problems, e.g. [20, 6, 19, 17].
Efficiency of Simple Auctions
Single-bid Auction with subadditive valuations has a PoA of O(logm) [4]. SIA with subadditive valuations
has a constant PoA [11]. Posted price auctions with XOS valuations give a constant factor approximate
welfare guarantee [12].
Other Measures of Complementarity
Some other useful measures include Positive Hypergraph (PH) [1] and Positive Lower Envelop (PLE) [8].
Eden et al. recently introduce an extensive measure which ranges from 1 to 2m to capture the smooth
transition of revenue approximation guarantee [5].
2 Expressiveness of the New Hierarchies
2.1 Characterization of Supermodular/Superadditive Widths
We first prove Theorems 1 and 2, which characterize supermodular/superadditive widths with d-scopic
submodular/subadditive functions.
Proof of Theorem 1. We now show SMW(f) ≤ d iff f is d-scopic submodular. First, suppose SMW(f) ≤ d.
Consider any triple (T, S, v) such that S ⊆ T ⊆ X and v 6∈ T . To show f is d-scopic submodular, we prove
by induction on the size of T , that
f(v|T ) ≤ max
T ′:T ′⊆T,|T ′|≤d
f(v|S ∪ T ′). (3)
As the base case, when |T | ≤ d, the inequality of (3) trivially holds because if T ′ = T \ S, then |T ′| ≤ d
and f(v|S ∪T ′) = f(v|T ). Inductively, assume that the statement is true for all {V ⊆ X : |V | ≤ k} for some
k ≥ d. Now consider any set T with |T | = k+ 1 > d. Because T is not supermodular, there is T ′′ ( T , such
that f(v|T ) ≤ f(v|T ′′). Applying the inductive hypothesis on (T ′′, S, v), we have:
f(v|T ′′) ≤ max
T ′:T ′⊆T ′′, |T ′|≤d
f(v|S ∪ T ′) ≤ max
T ′:T ′⊆T, |T ′|≤d
f(v|S ∪ T ′).
Thus, f(v|T ) ≤ f(v|T ′′) ≤ maxT ′:T ′⊆T, |T ′|≤d f(v|S ∪ T ′), and we have demonstrated that f is d-scopic
submodular.
For the other direction, we assume f is d-scopic submodular. There is no supermodular set of size larger
than d, because for any S, T , v /∈ T where |T | > d, there is some T ′ ⊆ T where |T ′| ≤ d, such that
f(v|S ∪ T ) ≤ f(v|S ∪ T ′), i.e. T is not supermodular. Therefore SMW(f) ≤ d.
Corollary 2.1. Set function f is submodular iff SMW(f) = 0 (i.e., f has no supermodular set).
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove SAW(f) ≤ d iff f is d-scopic subadditive. Suppose SAW(f) ≤ d. Consider S
and T where S ∩ T = ∅. We show d-scopic subadditivity by induction on the size of T . When |T | ≤ d, the
statement trivially holds. Suppose d-scopic subadditivity holds for |T | ≤ k where k ≥ d. For |T | = k+1 > d,
since T is not superadditive, there is T ′′ ( T , such that f(S|T ) ≤ f(S|T ′′). Applying inductive hypothesis
on S, T ′′ gives f(S|T ) ≤ f(S|T ′′) ≤ maxT ′:T ′⊆T, |T ′|≤d f(S|T ′), i.e. f is d-scopic subadditive.
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Now assume d-scopic subadditivity. There is no superadditive set with size larger than d, because for any
S and T where |T | > d and S ∩ T = ∅, there is some T ′ ⊆ T where |T ′| ≤ d, such that f(S|T ) ≤ f(S|T ′),
i.e. T is not superadditive.
Corollary 2.2. A set function f is subadditive iff SAW(f) = 0 (i.e., f has no superadditive set).
2.2 Supermodular Width vs Supermodular Degree
The following two propositions establish Theorem 3, showing supermodular width strictly dominates super-
modular degree.
Proposition 2.1. For any set function f , SD(f) ≤ SMW(f).
Proof. Fix f . Let T be a supermodular set of size SMW(f), and S, v be such that f(v|T ∪S) > f(v|T ′ ∪S),
∀T ′ ( T . Clearly for any t ∈ T , f(v|{t} ∪ (T \ {t}) ∪ S) > f(v|(T \ {t}) ∪ S). In other words, v →+ t for all
t ∈ T , so SD(f) ≥ deg+(v) ≥ |T | = SMW(f).
Proposition 2.2. There exists a monotone set function f with SMW(f) = 1 and SD(f) = m− 1.
Proof. Consider a symmetric5 f over a ground set X = [m], where f(S) = 0 if |S| ≤ 1, and f(S) = 1
otherwise. Observe that for any u 6= v, 1 = f(u|{v}) > f(u|∅) = f(u) = 0, so u →+ v, and SD(f) =
|Dep+f (u)| = m− 1. On the other hand, consider any T where |T | ≥ 2. For any v, S, we have |S ∪T | ≥ 2, so
0 = f(v|S ∪ T ) ≤ f(v|S). Thus, T is not supermodular. Since there is no supermodular set with size larger
than 1 and f is not submodular, SMW(f) = 1.
While the SAW hierarchy does not subsume the MPH hierarchy (see Proposition 2.6), we show that
there is a monotone set function in the lowest layer of the SAW hierarchy (i.e. a subadditive function) and
a notably high layer of the MPH hierarchy.
Proposition 2.3. There exists a monotone set function f with SAW(f) = 0 and MPH(f) = m2 .
Proof. The proposition is a direct corollary of Proposition L.2 in [8]. In fact, consider a symmetric valuation
f over [m], where f([m]) = 2, f(∅) = 0, and f(S) = 1 otherwise. Clearly f is subadditive so SAW(f) = 0.
According to Corollary F.5 of [8], MPH(f) ≥ m2 .
2.3 Further Comparisons between Hierarchies
Proposition 2.4. There exists a monotone set function f with SMW(f) = 1 and SAW(f) = m/2.
Proof. Let hT (S) = I[T ⊆ S]. Consider function f : 2X → R+ where X = [2t] and
f(S) =
∑
i∈[t]
h{i,i+t}(S).
SMW(f) = 1 because the only complement set to any item i ∈ [t] is i + t. On the other hand, T =
{t+ 1, . . . , 2t} is a complement set to S = [t], so SAW(f) = t = m/2.
Proposition 2.5. There exists a monotone set function f with SAW(f) = 0 and SMW(f) = m− 1.
Proof. Consider a symmetric f : 2X → R+, where f(∅) = 0, f(X) = 2 and f(S) = 1 otherwise. f
is subadditive so SAW(f) = 0. On the other hand, X \ {u} for any u is a complement set to u, so
SMW(f) = m− 1.
Proposition 2.6. There exists a monotone set function f with MPH(f) = 2 and SMW(f) = SAW(f) =
m− 1.
5f is symmetric if f(S) depends only on |S|.
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ALGORITHM 1: Batched Greedy Selection for Constrained Maximization (f, k)
let S0 ← ∅; i = 0;
while |Si| < k do
Let i = i + 1; Ti ← argmaxT ′⊆[m],|T ′|≤s f(T ′|Si) where s = min{SMW(f) + 1, k − |Si−1|};
let Si ← Si−1 ∪ Ti; ;
end
return SBatchedGreedy := Si;
Proof. Let hT (S) = I[T ⊆ S]. Consider function f : 2X → R+ where
f(S) =
∑
u6=v
h{u,v}(S).
f is in MPH-2 since its hypergraph representation consists of only hyperedges of size 2. Now consider any
u and T = X \ {u}. For any T ′ ( T ,
f(u|T ) = |T | > |T ′| = f(u|T ′).
In other words, T is both supermodular and superadditive, and SMW(f) = SAW(f) = m− 1.
3 Expanding Approximation Guarantees for Classic Maximiza-
tion
In this section, we focus on the connection between supermodular width and two classical optimization
problems, namely, the constrained and welfare set-function maximization. For submodular functions, greedy
algorithms provide tight approximation guarantees for both problems [21, 28]. Here, we will show that
simple modifications to these greedy algorithms can effectively utilize the mathematical structure underlying
the supermodular degree of f , namely the SMW(f)-scopic submodularity, for any set function f . We prove
that these extensions achieve approximation ratios parametrized by the supermodular width with the same
dependency as the supermodular degree provides [13, 9] for both maximization problems. We complement
our approximation results by nearly tight information-theoretical lower bounds.
3.1 Constrained Maximization
We first focus on cardinality constrained maximization, a problem at the center of resource allocation and
network influence [23, 16, 21, 28]. Formally:
Definition 12 (Cardinality Constrained Maximization). Given a monotone set function f : 2X → R+∪{0}
and integer k > 0, compute a set S ⊆ X with |S| ≤ k that maximizes f(S).
We will analyze an algorithm which performs batched greedy selection, — see Algorithm 1 below — where
the batch size is a function of the supermodular width of f . In particular, for an input set function, the
batched greedy algorithm chooses a set of size not exceeding SMW(f) + 1 which maximizes marginal gain,
till all k elements are chosen.
Below, we show that this simple greedy algorithm provides strong approximation guarantees in terms of
the supermodular width of the input function.
Theorem 8 (Extending [13]). For any monotone set function f over [m], Algorithm 1 achieves
(
1− e−1/(SMW(f)+1))-
approximation for constrained maximization problem after making O
(
mSMW(f)+1
)
value queries.
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Proof. The proof uses similar ideas to those in [13], which are originally from [21]. Let d = SMW(f) and
(w.l.o.g.) let S∗ = [k] = {1, . . . , k} be an optimal solution.
f(S∗)− f(Si) ≤ f(S∗ ∪ Si)− f(Si) (4)
≤ f(S∗|Si)
= f([k]|Si)
=
∑
j∈[k]
f(j|[j − 1] ∪ Si)
≤ kmax
j
f(j|[j − 1] ∪ Si)
≤ kmax
j
max
Uj :Uj⊆[j−1], |Uj |≤d
f(j|Uj ∪ Si) (5)
≤ kmax
j
max
Uj :Uj⊆[j−1], |Uj |≤d
f({j} ∪ Uj |Si) (6)
≤ kf(Si+1|Si) (7)
= k(f(Si+1)− f(Si))
where (4) is by the monotonicity of f , (5) is by the equivalent d-scopic submodularity of f , (6) is again by
the monotonicity of f , and (7) is by the greedy property: f(Si+1|Si) = maxS:|S|≤d+1 f(S|Si).
Now we have
f(S∗)− f(Si) ≤ k − 1
k
(f(S∗)− f(Si−1))
≤
(
k − 1
k
)i
(f(S∗)− f(S0))
=
(
k − 1
k
)i
f(S∗)
≤ e−i/kf(S∗).
Because f is monotone, we have |Ti| = d + 1, for all intermediate steps, i.e., i < d kSMW(f)+1e. Thus, Algo-
rithm 1 takes exactly t := d kSMW(f)+1e steps to terminate. The function value of its output f(SBatchedGreedy) :=
f(St) ≥
(
1− e−1/(SMW(f)+1)) f(S∗).
While in general, Theorem 8 establishes a tighter approximation guarantee for the SMW hierarchy than
that for the SD hierarchy, we note that in case of submodular degree, if the positive dependency graph is
given, the running times are often of the form poly(n) · 2O(SD(f)), which can be significantly better than
nO(SMW(f)) even if the submodular width SMW(f) is much smaller than the submodular degree SD(f).
We now provide a nearly-matching information-theoretical lower bound, suggesting that our approxi-
mation guarantee is essentially optimal. In the theorem below, the exponent k0.99 can be replaced by any
function of k in o(k).
Theorem 9. For any d ∈ N, ε > 0, and a large enough integer k, there exists a set function f : 2[m] →
R+, with SMW(f) = d, such that any (possibly randomized) algorithm that produces a (1/(d + 1) + ε)-
approximation (with a constant probability if randomized) for the k-constrained maximization problem makes
at least Ω
(
(m/2k)k
0.99
)
value queries.
Proof. The proof is based on similar high-level ideas to those in [19], but the detailed construction and
key properties used are different. Consider a ground set X of m elements, which contains a subset R of r
“special” elements. We will specify r below. We now construct a “hard-to-distinguish” function fR such that
for any S ⊆ X, fR(S) = gR(|S|, I[R ⊆ S]) for a function gR : N×{0, 1} → R. In other words, fR depends on
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the cardinality of S and whether or not S completely contains R. For discussion below, let D = d+ 1, and
let c1 and c2 be two integers to be determined later. We set |R| = r = c1 ·D + 1. We define fR as follows:
fR(S) =

b|S|/Dc, |S| ≤ c1D
b(|S| − c1D)/Dc+ c1, c1D < |S| ≤ (c1 + c2)D, R 6⊆ S
|S| − c1(D − 1), c1D < |S| ≤ (c1 + c2)D, R ⊆ S
|S| − (c1 + c2)(D − 1), (c1 + c2)D < |S| ≤ (c1 + c2)D + c2(D − 1), R 6⊆ S
c1 + c2D, (c1 + c2)D < |S| ≤ (c1 + c2)D + c2(D − 1), R ⊆ S
c1 + c2D, (c1 + c2)D + c2(D − 1) < |S| ≤ m
.
We will use the following three properties of fR:
• Whenever |S| mod D = D − 1, for any v /∈ S, fR(v|S) = 1. Consequently, SMW(fR) ≤ d,∀R ⊆ X
with |R| = r. In fact, this property ensures that fR(v|S ∪ T ′) ≥ fR(v|S ∪ T ), for any v ∈ X, S, T ⊆ X
with |T | ≥ D = d+ 1, and any proper subset T ′ of T with |S ∪ T ′| mod D = D− 1. Note that such a
subset T ′ always exists.
• max {fR(S) | |S| = (c1 + c2)D} = c1 + c2D. The maximum is achieved whenever R ⊆ S.
• For any S ⊆ X satisfying |S| = c1 + c2D and R 6⊆ S, fR(S) = c1 + c2.
First, consider k = (c1 + c2)D. We have, for any S with |S| = k:
fR(S) =
{
c1 + c2D if R ⊆ S
c1 + c2 otherwise.
Suppose c1 = o(c2). To obtain an approximation ratio better than (c1 + c2)/(c1 + c2D) → 1/D for k-
constrained maximization of fR, any algorithm must find a set with size k that contains all special elements
in R.
For our lower bound, we will analyze the following slightly relaxed variation of the problem: Let K =
(c1 + c2)D+ c2(D−1)−1 > k. Find a set of size K which contains R as a subset. Note that K is the largest
number where fR(S) — for |S| = K — depends on whether or not S contains R. In this case, note that
the algorithm has no incentive to make queries of fR(S) for |S| < K or |S| > K, because the former reveals
no more information than querying any of its supersets of size K, and the latter simply does not give any
information.
We first focus on the query complexity of any deterministic optimization algorithm. Assume the algorithm
makes T queries regarding S1, . . . , ST , where |Si| = K, ∀i ∈ [T ], which are deterministically chosen when the
algorithm is fixed. We now establish a condition on T such that there is a subset R such that R 6⊂ Si,∀i ∈ [T ].
Consider the distribution where the r elements are selected uniformly at random. Let Ci be the event that
Si contains R. Then,
Pr[C1 ∪ · · · ∪ CT ] ≤
∑
i
Pr[Ci] <
∑
i
( |Si|
m
)r
= T
(
(c1 + c2)D + (D − 1)c2 − 1
m
)c1D+1
≤ T
(
2c2D
m
)c1D
.
So, if T ≤ [m/(2c2D)]c1D then Pr[C1∪ · · ·∪CT ] < 1. In other words, for any selections S1, . . . , ST ⊆ X with
|Si| = K, there is a subset R, such that R 6⊂ Si,∀i ∈ [T ], implying the deterministic algorithm with querying
set S1, . . . , ST will not find a good approximation to fR. Let c2 =
1
2c
1.01
1 , so k
0.99 = ((c1 + c2)D)
0.99 ≤
(c1.011 D)
0.99 ≤ c1D. We have (m/2c2D)c1D ≥ (m/2k)k
0.99
. Thus, we conclude that any (1/(d + 1) + ε)-
approximation deterministic algorithm must make at least (m/2k)k
0.99
value queries.
Now consider a randomized optimization algorithm. Conditioned on the random bits of the algo-
rithm, the above argument still works. Taking expectation of the probability of success, we see that the
overall probability of success is at most T (2k/m)k
0.99
. Thus, a constant probability of success requires
T = Ω
(
(m/2k)k
0.99
)
.
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ALGORITHM 2: Batched Greedy for Welfare Maximization (f1, . . . , fn)
for j ∈ [n] do
let Xj,0 ← ∅;
end
Let d = maxj{SMW(fj)}; let i = 0;
while ∪jXj,i 6= X do
Let i = i + 1; let (Ti, j
∗
i ) = argmax(T ′,j): |T ′|≤s,j∈[n] fj (T
′|Xj,i−1) where s = min
{
d + 1, n−∑j |Xj,i−1|};
Let Xj∗i ,i ← Xj∗i ,i−1 ∪ Ti;
for j ∈ [n] \ {j∗i } do
let Xj,i ← Xj,i−1;
end
return XBatchedGreedyj := Xj,i for every agent j;
end
3.2 Welfare Maximization
We now turn our attention to welfare maximization. Formally:
Definition 13 (Welfare Maximization). Given n monotone set functions f1, . . . , fn over 2
[m], compute n
disjoint sets X1, . . . , Xn that maximizes
∑
i∈[n] fi(Xi).
Because f1, . . . , fn are monotone, the optimal solution to welfare maximization is a partition of X = [m].
Thus, welfare maximization can also be viewed as a generalized clustering or multiway partitioning problem.
We will analyze the following greedy algorithm — see Algorithm 2 below — which repeatedly assigns
groups of elements to agents. At each step, the algorithm picks a set of size not exceeding maxi SMW(fi)+1
— as opposed to one — that provides the largest possible marginal gain to some agent and assigns the set
to that agent.
We now prove the following approximation guarantee in terms of supermodular width.
Theorem 10 (Extending [9]). For any collection of monotone set functions f1, . . . , fn over X = [m], Algo-
rithm 2 achieves 12+maxi{SMW(fi)} -approximation for welfare maximization, after making O
(
nmmaxi{SMW(fi)}+1
)
value queries.
Proof. The proof uses similar ideas to those in [9], which are originally from [15]. Following the notation in
Algorithm 2, we use i to denote the step and j to denote the agent’s index. Recall d = maxj{SMW(fj)}.
Suppose (X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n) is an optimal solution to the welfare maximization of (f1, . . . , fn). Note that ∪jXj,i
is the subset of elements that has already been assigned at the end of step i. Let Tj,i = X
∗
j \ ∪jXj,i denote
the set of elements of X∗j still available at the time. Recall at step i, the set Ti is allocated to agent j
∗
i . In
other words, Xj∗i ,i = Xj∗i ,i−1∪Ti and fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i)−fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i−1) = fj∗i (Ti|Xj∗i ,i−1). According to Algorithm 2,|Ti| ≤ d+ 1. We now prove the following instrumental inequality to our analysis.
(d+ 2) · (fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i)− fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i−1)) = (d+ 2) · fj∗i (Ti|Xj∗i ,i−1) ≥∑
j
(fj(Tj,i−1|Xj,i−1)− fj(Tj,i|Xj,i)) . (8)
We divide the right hand terms according to two cases:
Case 1 (terms with j ∈ [n] \ {j∗i }): Note that (T1,i−1 ∩ Ti, . . . , Tn,i−1 ∩ Ti) is a partition of Ti because
(X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n) is a partition of X. Let dj = |Tj,i−1 ∩ Ti|. We have,∑
j 6=j∗i
dj ≤ |Ti| ≤ d+ 1.
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Thus, for any j 6= j∗, for analysis below, let’s name the dj elements in Tj,i−1 ∩ Ti as
{
u
(j)
1 , . . . , u
(j)
dj
}
. Note
that for j 6= j∗, Xj,i−1 = Xj,i and Tj,i = Tj,i−1 \
{
u
(j)
1 , . . . , u
(j)
dj
}
, which implies the first equality below:
fj (Tj,i−1|Xj,i−1)− fj(Tj,i|Xj,i)
= fj
({
u
(j)
1 , . . . , u
(j)
dj
}
|Tj,i ∪Xj,i−1
)
=
dj∑
k=1
fj
(
u
(j)
k
∣∣ {u(j)1 , . . . , u(j)k−1} ∪ Tj,i ∪Xj,i−1)
≤
dj∑
k=1
 max
Vk⊆
{
u
(j)
1 ,...,u
(j)
k−1
}
∪Tj,i, |Vk|≤d
fj
(
u
(j)
k |Vk ∪Xj,i−1
) (9)
≤
dj∑
k=1
 max
Vk⊆
{
u
(j)
1 ,...,u
(j)
k−1
}
∪Tj,i, |Vk|≤d
fj
({
u
(j)
k
}
∪ Vk|Xj,i−1
) (10)
≤ djfj∗i (Ti|Xj∗i ,i−1), (11)
where (9) follows from the d-scopic submodularity of fj (note that u
(j)
k /∈ Tj,i for j 6= j∗), (10) follows from
monotonicity of fj , and (11) follows from the batched greedy selection of Algorithm 2 that fj∗i (Ti|Xj∗i ,i−1)
achieves the maximal possible marginal among sets of size at most d+ 1. Summing over j 6= j∗, we have:∑
j 6=j∗
(fj (Tj,i−1|Xj,i−1)− fj (Tj,i|Xj,i)) ≤
∑
j 6=j∗
dj · fj∗i
(
Ti|Xj∗i ,i−1
) ≤ (d+ 1) · fj∗i (Ti|Xj∗i ,i−1) (12)
Case 2 (term with j∗i ):
fj∗i (Tj∗i ,i−1|Xj∗i ,i−1)+fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i−1) = fj∗i (Tj∗i ,i−1∪Xj∗i ,i−1) ≤ fj∗i (Tj∗i ,i∪Xj∗i ,i) = fj∗i (Tj∗i ,i|Xj∗i ,i)+fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i).
Therefore,
fj∗i (Tj∗i ,i−1|Xj+i∗,i−1)− fj∗i (Tj∗i ,i|Xj∗i ,i) ≤ fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i)− fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i−1) = fj∗i
(
Ti|Xj∗i ,i−1
)
. (13)
Combining (12) and (13), we have established (8). Now, suppose the algorithm terminates after t steps,
during which at step i, subset Ti is allocated to agent j
∗
i . We have:
n∑
j=1
fj
(
X∗j
)
=
n∑
j=1
fj (Tj,0|Xj,0)
=
∑
0≤i<t
∑
j
(fj (Tj,i|Xj,i)− fj (Tj,i+1|Xj,i+1))
≤ (d+ 2)
∑
0≤i<t
(
fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i)− fj∗i (Xj∗i ,i−1)
)
= (d+ 2)
n∑
j=1
fj(Xj,t)
= (d+ 2)
n∑
j=1
fj
(
XBatchedGreedyj
)
.
To show that our algorithm is nearly optimal, we prove the following information-theoretical lower bound:
Similar to Theorem 9, the exponent (m/n)0.99 in the theorem below, can be replaced by any function of
m/n in o(m/n).
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Theorem 11. For any d ∈ N, ε > 0, there is a family of function f1, . . . , fn : 2[m] → R+ with SMW(fi) =
d,∀i ∈ [n], such that any (possibly randomized) algorithm that produces a (1/(d+1)+ε)-approximation (with
constant probability if randomized) for the n-agent welfare maximization problem makes at least Ω
(
(n/2D)(m/n)
0.99
)
value queries.
Proof. This proof follows from a similar argument as the proof for Theorem 9. Consider a ground set X of
m elements, which contains a family of subsets R1, . . . , Rn of r “special” elements. We will specify r below.
We construct a family of (a slightly different version of) “hard-to-distinguish” set functions, which have the
same supermodular degree.
To formulate these functions, let us first consider a set R ⊆ X of r elements. We construct a function
fR such that for any S ⊆ X, fR(S) = gR(|S|, I[R ⊆ S]), for a function gR : N× B→ R. Like in Theorem 9,
fR depends on the cardinality of S and whether or not S completely contains R. In the discussion below,
let D = d+ 1, and let c1 and c2 be functions of m and n to be determined later. We set |R| = r = c1D + 1.
We define fR as follows:
fR(S) =

b|S|/Dc, R 6⊆ S, |S| ≤ c1D + c2D2 − 1
c1 + c2D, R 6⊆ S, |S| ≥ c1D + c2D2
|S| − c1(D − 1), R ⊆ S, c1D < |S| ≤ (c1 + c2)D − 1
c1 + c2D, R ⊆ S, |S| ≥ (c1 + c2)D
.
Like in Theorem 9 — for similar reasons — fR is in SMW(fR) ≤ d.
Each instance of the n-agent welfare maximization is defined by a family of subsets R1, . . . , Rn ⊆ X
satisfying for any i 6= j, Ri ∩Rj = ∅. The i-th agent’s valuation function is then fi := fRi .
Consider the case m = n · s for s := (c1 + c2)D. We will use the following properties:
• A partition (X1, . . . , Xn) of X is an optimal solution to the n-agent welfare maximization problem
with value functions fR1 , . . . , fRn if and only if Xi ⊇ Ri,∀i ∈ [n]. The maximum welfare achievable is
n(c1 + c2D).
• Let t = c1D + c2D2 − 1, which is the largest size of S such that f(S) is not a constant. If no agent
i receives a set Xi with |Xi| ≤ t that is a superset of Ri, then the maximum possible welfare is
bns/Dc ≤ n(c1 + c2).
So no algorithm can — when c1 = o(c2) — achieve a better approximation ratio than [n(c1 + c2)]/[n(c1 +
c2D)] → 1/D without finding a set Xi of size at most t containing Ri, for some i. We therefore reduce the
analysis to a simple problem, where the goal is to find a set of size t = c1D + c2D
2 − 1 containing some
Ri as a subset: For each query, the algorithm can specify a set S and an index i ∈ [k], and is informed —
by observing fi(S) — whether S contains Ri. For similar reasons as in Theorem 9, the algorithm has no
incentive to make queries of fi(S) for |S| < t or |S| > t.
We focus on the query complexity of any deterministic welfare optimization algorithms. Assume the
algorithm makes T queries, (S1, k1), . . . , (ST , kT ) with |Si| = t, ∀i ∈ [T ], which are deterministically chosen
when the algorithm is fixed. We now establish a condition on T such that there is a family of disjoint
subsets (R1, ..., Rn) such that Rki 6⊂ Si,∀i ∈ [T ]. Consider the distribution R1, . . . , Rn uniformly at random
conditioned on Ri ∩Rj = ∅. Let Ci be the event that Si contains Rki . Then,
Pr[C1 ∪ · · · ∪ CT ] ≤
∑
i
Pr[Ci] <
∑
i
( |Si|
m
)r
= T
(
c1D + c2D
2 − 1
m
)c1D+1
≤ T
(
2c2D
2
m
)c1D
.
So, if T ≤ [m/(2c2D2)]c1D then Pr[C1 ∪ · · · ∪CT ] < 1. In other words, for any queries (S1, k1), . . . , (ST , kT )
with |Si| = t, ∀i ∈ [T ], there are disjoint subsets R1, . . . , Rn such that Rki 6⊂ Si,∀i ∈ [T ], implying the deter-
ministic algorithm with queries (S1, k1), . . . , (ST , kT ), will not find a good approximation to (fR1 , . . . , fRn).
Let c2 =
1
2c
1.01
1 . We have
m
n
= s = (c1 + c2)D ≥ c2D = 2c2D
2
2D
⇒ m
2c2D2
≥ n
2D
,
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and (m
n
)0.99
= s0.99 = (c1D + 1/2c
1.01
1 D)
0.99 ≤ c1D.
So
(
m/2c2D
2
)c1D ≥ (n/2D)(m/n)0.99 . Thus, we conclude that any (1/(d+ 1) + ε)-approximation algorithm
must make at least (n/2D)(m/n)
0.99
value queries.
Now consider a randomized welfare optimization algorithm. Conditioned on the random bits of the
algorithm, the above argument still works. Taking expectation of the probability of success, we see that the
overall probability of success is at most T (2D/n)(m/n)
0.99
. Thus, a constant probability of success requires
T = Ω
(
(n/2D)(m/n)
0.99
)
.
4 Efficiency of Simple Auctions
In this section, we study the connection between the SAW hierarchy and efficiency of auctions. We will draw
extensively on previous work in this area, particularly on the characterization based on the CH hierarchy —
see definition below — which is arguably the most simple class of set functions with complementarity.
Definition 14 (d-Constraint Homogeneous Functions [10]). A set function f over ground set X is d-
constraint homogeneous (CH-d) if there exists a value fˆ , and disjoint sets Q1, . . . , Qh ⊆ X with |Qi| ≤
d,∀i ∈ [h], such that (1) f(Qi) = fˆ · |Qi|,∀i ∈ [h], and (2) the value of every set S ⊆ [m] is simply the sum
of values of contained Qi’s, i.e., f(S) =
∑
Qi⊆S f(Qi) = fˆ ·
∑
Qi⊆S |Qi|.
We will show that previous characterization of auction efficiency [10] can be approximately extended
from the CH hierarchy to the SAW hierarchy.
4.1 Backgrounds: Related Definitions and Results
We first restate a useful definition and a lemma for analyzing the efficiency of auction mechanisms.
Definition 15 ([26]). An auction mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth for a class of valuations F = ×iFi if for
any valuation profile f ∈ F , there exists a (possibly randomized) action profile a∗i (f) such that for every
action profile a: ∑
i
Ea′i∼a∗i (f)[ui(a
′
i, a−i; fi)] ≥ λ ·OPT(f)− µ
∑
i
Pi(a),
where ui(a
′
i; fi) is the utility of i given action profile (a
′
i, a−i), OPT(f) is the optimum social welfare given
valuation profile f , and Pi(a) is the payment of i given action profile a.
Lemma 4.1 ([26]). If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth then the price of anarchy w.r.t. coarse correlated equi-
libria is at most max{1, µ}/λ.
For Single-bid Auction and Simultaneous Item First Price Auction (SIA), we will derive our results from
the following results for CH-d and MPH-d.
Theorem 12 (Smoothness of Single-bid Auction with CH-d Valuations [10]). Single-bid Auction is a ((1−
e−d)/d, 1)-smooth mechanism when agents have CH-d valuations. Consequently, Single-bid Auction has a
PoA of (1− e−d)/d with CH-d valuations w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria.
Theorem 13 (Smoothness of SIA with MPH-d Valuations [8]). For SIA, when bidders have MPH-d valua-
tions, both the correlated price of anarchy and the Bayes-Nash price of anarchy are at most 2d. The bound
follows from a smoothness argument.
A key concept to extend these results to other valuation classes is the following notion of pointwise
approximation defined in [4].
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Definition 16 (Pointwise Approximation [4]). A class of set functions F over ground set X is pointwise
β-approximated by another class F ′ of set functions over X if ∀f ∈ F , S ⊆ X, ∃f ′S ∈ F ′ such that (1)
βf ′S(S) ≥ f(S) and (2) ∀T ⊆ X, f ′S(T ) ≤ f(T ).
For example:
Proposition 4.1 ([10]). The class max(F) is pointwise 1-approximated by the class F .
We say a function f ′ : 2X → R pointwise β-approximates f : 2X → R (at X), if (1) βf ′(X) ≥ f(X), and
(2) ∀T ⊆ X, f ′(T ) ≤ f(T ).
The following lemma of [4] provides a way to translate PoA bounds between classes via pointwise ap-
proximation.
Lemma 4.2 (Extension Lemma [4]). If a mechanism for a combinatorial auction setting is (λ, µ)-smooth
for the class of set functions F ′, and F is pointwise β-approximated by F ′, then it is
(
λ
β , µ
)
-smooth for the
class F . And as a result, if a mechanism for a combinatorial auction setting has a PoA of α given by a
smoothness argument for the class F ′, and F is pointwise β-approximated by F ′, then it has a PoA of αβ
for the class F .
4.2 Efficiency of Simple Auctions Parametrized by SAW
Applying Lemma 4.2, we are able to translate Theorems 12 and 13 to the SAW hierarchy.
Theorem 14 (Efficiency of Single-bid Auction with SAW-d Valuations). When agents have valuations
f1, . . . , fn ∈ max(SAW-d), Single-bid Auction has a price of anarchy of at most 2d1−e−2d ·Hm2d w.r.t. coarse
correlated equilibria.
Theorem 15 (Efficiency of SIA with SAW-dValuations). When agents have valuations f1, . . . , fn ∈ max(SAW-d),
SIA has a price of anarchy of at most 8d ·Hm
2d
w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria.
Formally, Theorems 14 and 15 follow from Theorems 12 and 13 respectively, with the help of Lemma 4.2,
Proposition 4.1, and the technical lemma (Lemma 4.3) that we will establish below, showing that for any
d ∈ N, functions in SAW-d can be approximated by CH-2d functions. In particular, Lemma 4.3 establishes
the approximation of SAW hierarchy by CH hierarchy with a loss of factor O(logm).
Lemma 4.3 (Pointwise Approximation of SAW Hierarchy by CH-Hierarchy). For any d ∈ N, SAW-d is
pointwise 2Hm
2d
-approximated by CH-2d, where Hi =
∑
k∈[i]
1
k is the i-th harmonic number.
Proof. Our proof is inspired by the constructions of [4] and [10].
For any f ∈ SAW-d over X = [m], we first apply the following greedy construction to obtain a partition
Q = {Qi}i∈[q] of [m] into sets of size not exceeding 2d: At step i, we select a new setQi ⊆ [m]\(Q1∪· · ·∪Qi−1),
with maximum f(Qi), among all sets of size at most 2d.
We first prove by contradiction that there exists a function g in CH-2d which 2Hm
2d
-approximates f at
[m]. That is, (1) 2Hm
2d
g([m]) ≥ f([m]) and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f(T ).
Suppose this statement is not true. Let
hQ(T ) =
f([m])
β · | ∪i Qi|
∑
Qi⊆T
|Qi|.
Note that hQ ∈ CH-2d because |Qi| ≤ 2d, ∀Qi ∈ Q. We now construct a series of functions based on hQ,
and prove that for any β > 0, if there is no g among these functions that is a β-approximation of f at [m]
— that is, there is no g such that (1) βg([m]) ≥ f([m]) and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f(T ), (below we will refer
to this condition as Assumption (*)) — then β < 2Hm
2d
.
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First consider hQ. Note that βhQ([m]) = β
f([m])
β ≥ f([m]), because Q is a partition of [m]. Assumption
(*) then implies there is a T1 such that hQ(T1) > f(T1). W.l.o.g. assume T1 is a union of sets from Q (such
T1 exists because f is monotone).
Let S1 = [m]. We now iteratively define Si = Si−1\Ti−1, and construct its associated Ti. The construction
maintains the following invariant: Both Si and Ti are unions of sets from Q. The former follows directly
from the iterative property that Si−1 and Ti−1 are both unions of sets from Q. Our construction below will
ensure the latter.
Let QSi = {Q ∈ Q | Q ⊆ Si}. Let
hQSi =
f([m])
β · | ∪j:Qj∈QSi Qj |
∑
j:Qj∈QSi
|Qj |.
Again, hQSi ∈ CH-2d, and hQSi ([m]) =
f([m])
β . Assumption (*) then implies there is a Ti such that hQSi (Ti) >
f(Ti). Again, w.l.o.g. assume Ti is a union of sets from Q (such Ti exists because f is monotone). This
iterative process terminates, producing a partition {Ti}i∈[t] of [m], which satisfies:∑
i
f(Ti) <
∑
i
hQSi (Ti) =
f([m])
β
∑
i
|Ti|
|Si| ≤
f([m])
β
∑
i∈[t]
1
i
≤ f([m])
β
Hm
2d
.
We now show that
∑
i f(Ti) ≥ 12f([m]). Recall that each member in partition {Ti}i is a unions of sets
from Q. We renumber {Ti}i, in a way that for any i < j, there is some Ti ⊇ Qk ∈ Q, such that for any
Tj ⊇ Ql ∈ Q, k < l. That is, the smallest index k where Qk ∈ Ti is smaller than the smallest index l where
Ql ∈ Tj , as long as i < j.
Since (T1, . . . , Tt) is a partition of [m], we have:
f([m]) =
∑
i
f(Ti|Ti+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tt)
≤
∑
i
max{f(Ti|Ui) | Ui ⊆ Ti+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tt, |Ui| ≤ d} (14)
≤
∑
i
max{f(Ti ∪ Ui) | Ui ⊆ Ti+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tt, |Ui| ≤ d} (15)
=
∑
i
max{(f(Ui|Ti) + f(Ti)) | Ui ⊆ Ti+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tt, |Ui| ≤ d}
≤
∑
i
max{(f(Ui|Vi) + f(Ti)) | Ui ⊆ Ti+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tt, |Ui| ≤ d, Vi ⊆ Ti, |Vi| ≤ d} (16)
≤
∑
i
max{(f(Ui ∪ Vi) + f(Ti)) | Ui ⊆ Ti+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tt, |Ui| ≤ d, Vi ⊆ Ti, |Vi| ≤ d} (17)
≤
∑
i
(f(Qki) + f(Ti)), where ki = min{k | Ti ⊇ Qk ∈ Q} (18)
≤
∑
i
2f(Ti), (19)
where (14) and (16) follow from d-scopic subadditivity of f , (15), (17) and (19) follow from monotonicity of
f , and (18) holds because, according to the construction of {Ql}l, Qki maximizes f among all sets of size 2d
contained in Qki ∪ · · · ∪Qq ⊇ Ti ∪ · · · ∪ Tt, and in particular Ui ∪ Vi ⊆ Ti ∪ · · · ∪ Tt.
Consequently, it follows from
∑
i f(Ti) ≥ 12f([m]) that:
Hm
2d
f([m])
β
>
∑
i
f(Ti) ≥ 1
2
f([m])⇒ β < 2Hm
2d
.
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Thus, Assumption (*) with β ≥ 2Hm
2d
leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we have established that there
exists a CH-2d function g such that (1) g([m]) ≥ 2Hm
2d
f([m]) and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f(T ).
As in [10], the above proof can be simply extended to prove for any S ⊆ X, there exists a CH-2d function
g such that (1) g(S) ≥ 2Hm
2d
f([m]) and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f(T ). Essentially, we restrict the function f
to 2S , apply the argument above, and then span the obtained function back to 2X .
Therefore, SAW-d is pointwise 2Hm
2d
-approximated by CH-2d.
We further analyze previously known hard instances to both auctions, and show that they provide almost
matching lower bounds to the above two efficiency upper bounds.
Theorem 16. There is an instance with SAW-d valuations for any d, where the PoS of Single-bid Auction
is at least d+ 1− ε/d for any ε > 0.
Proof. Consider two players with valuations f1 and f2 over ground set X = [m]. Let hT (S) = I[T ⊆ S],
f1(S) =
∑
2≤i≤d+1 h{1,i}, and f2(S) = I[1 ∈ S]
(
d
d+1 + ε
)
. Both f1 and f2 are in SAW-d because there are
at most d+ 1 items which matter to the valuations. As shown in Proposition 3.9 of [10], Single-bid Auction
has a PoS of d+ 1− ε/d on this instance.
Theorem 17. There is an instance with SAW-d valuations for any d, where the PoA of SIA is at least
d+ 1/(d+ 1).
Proof. Consider the instance given in Theorem 2.5 of [8]. That is, a projective plane of order d+ 1. There
are d(d + 1) + 1 players, each desiring only a bundle of size d + 1, so the valuations of all players are in
SAW-d. As shown by Theorem 2.5 of [8] SIA has a PoA of at least d+ 1/(d+ 1) on the above instance.
4.3 Efficiency of Simple Auctions Parametrized by SMW
As a byproduct of our efficiency results for the SAW hierarchy, we prove similar, but slightly weaker, results
for the SMW hierarchy. We note that these bounds extend a central result in [10], which states that when
agents have valuations in max(SD-d ∩ SUPADD), Single-bid Auction has a PoA of O(d2 logm).
Theorem 18 (Extending [10]). When agents have valuations f1, . . . , fn ∈ max(SMW-d∩SUPADD), Single-
bid Auction has a price of anarchy of at most (d+1)
2
1−e−(d+1) ·H md+1 w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria.
Theorem 19. When agents have valuations f1, . . . , fn ∈ max(SMW-d ∩ SUPADD), SIA has a price of
anarchy of at most 2(d+ 1)2 ·H m
d+1
w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria.
Like Theorems 14 and 15, the two theorems above follow from Theorems 12 and 13 respectively, with
the help of Lemma 4.2, Proposition 4.1, and the technical lemma below.
Lemma 4.4. For any d ∈ N, SMW-d ∩ SUPADD is pointwise (d+ 1)H m
d+1
-approximated by CH-(d+ 1).
Proof. The proof essentially follows from the same argument as that for Lemma 4.3. For any superadditive
f over X = [m] with SMW(f) ≤ d, we first greedily construct a partition {Qi}i of X: At step i, we select a
set Qi of at most d+1 elements from X \(Q1∪· · ·∪Qi−1) that maximizes f(Qi). For x ∈ X, let index(x) = i
iff x ∈ Qi. W.l.o.g., for analysis below, we assume that elements in X are already sorted (or are renumbered)
according to their indices, i.e., if index(x) < index(y) then x < y.
Following the proof of Lemma 4.3, we focus on proving by contradiction that there exists a CH-(d + 1)
function g that (d + 1)H m
d+1
-approximates f . That is (1) (d + 1)H m
d+1
g([m]) ≥ f([m]) and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m],
g(T ) ≤ f(T ).
Suppose this statement is not true. Letting
hQSi =
f([m])
β · | ∪j:Qj∈QSi Qj |
∑
j:Qj∈QSi
|Qj |,
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and starting with S1 = [m], we can use the same iterative process to construct a sequence ((S1, T1), . . . , (St, Tt))
for some t ∈ N such that (1) for all i ∈ [t], both Si and Ti are unions of sets from Q, (2) (T1, . . . , Tn) is a
partition of X, and (3)
∑
i f(Ti) <
f([m])
β H md+1 , under that assumption that β is a parameter such that all
induced functions (from CH-(d+ 1)) satisfying (1) hQSi ([m]) =
f([m])
β , and (2) hQSi (Ti) > f(Ti).
Now we have:
f([m]) =
∑
k
f(k|[k − 1])
≤
∑
k
max
Uk:Uk⊆[k−1], |Uk|≤d
f(k|Uk) (20)
≤
∑
k
max
Uk:Uk⊆[k−1], |Uk|≤d
f({k} ∪ Uk) (21)
≤
∑
k
f(Qdm−k+1d+1 e) (22)
=
∑
j
|Qj |f(Qj)
≤ (d+ 1)
∑
j
f(Qj)
where (20) follows from the fact that f ∈ SAW-d, (21) follows from monotonicity, and (22) holds because by
the construction of {Qi}i, Qdm−k+1d+1 e maximizes f among all sets of size d+ 1 contained in [k].
On the other hand, since every Ti is a union of some Qj ’s, according to superadditivity of f ,
β <
(
H m
d+1
f([m])
)(∑
i
f(Ti)
)−1
≤
(
H m
d+1
f([m])
)(∑
i
f(Qi)
)−1
≤
(
H m
d+1
(d+ 1)
∑
i
f(Qi)
)(∑
i
f(Qi)
)−1
= (d+ 1)H m
d+1
.
For all other set S ⊆ X, we can apply a similar restricting-and-spanning-back argument with the above
construction to prove that there exists a CH-(d+ 1) function g such that (1) (d+ 1)H m
d+1
g(S) ≥ f([S]), and
(2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f(T ).
5 Remarks
5.1 Further Comparative Analysis
As observed by Eden et al. [5], the right measure of complementarity often varies from application to
application. This seems to be true even with the supermodular vs superadditive widths. We note that
while the SD and SMW hierarchies give nontrivial bounds on the PoA of simple auctions, SAW hierarchy
seems to capture the intrinsic property needed by efficiency guarantees for simple auctions. It provides
tighter characterization of PoA with a gap of logm (instead of d logm) between upper and lower bounds.
On the other hand, while SMW hierarchy captures the intrinsic property needed by the constrained/welfare
maximization, it remains open whether a small superadditive width provides any approximation guarantee
for the two optimization problems.
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Figure 1: Relationship between hierarchies.
The MPH hierarchy takes a different approach from ours — it relies on a syntactic definition which pro-
vides elegant and intuitive structures. In contrast, both SMW and SAW hierarchies — like the SD hierarchy
before it — are built on concrete natural concepts of witnesses and semantic intuition of complementarity.
In the current definition, the MPH hierarchy is not an extension to submodularity or subadditivity. Rather
— as shown in [8] — MPH can be considered as an extension to the fractionally subadditive (or XOS)
class proposed in [18]. We therefore consider SMW, MPH and SAW parallel measures of complementarity,
just like submodularity, fractional subadditivity and subadditivity in the complement-free case. One key
difference is that the three hierarchies seem to diverge at higher levels of complementarity, as opposed to the
fact that submodular functions are all fractionally subadditive, and fractionally subadditive functions are
all subadditive. This phenomenon provides further evidence that the three hierarchies are likely to capture
different aspects of complementarity. See Figure 1 for a comparison.
We also note that all upper bounds supported by our hierarchies are accompanied by almost matching
lower bounds, which we consider as a justification of our definitions — they manage to categorize set functions
roughly according to their “hardness” in different settings (i.e. optimization for SMW and efficiency for SAW).
In contrast, while the less inclusive supermodular degree hierarchy supports a number of upper bounds, to
our knowledge, none of those results are proven tight.
5.2 Final Remarks and Open Problems
Our SMW and SAW hierarchies may be applied to other problem settings. For example, for the online
secretary problem based on supermodular degree [14], we believe that with a slight modification of the
algorithms and the analysis, we could replace supermodular degree with supermodular width as well for this
problem; also, SMW-d functions are efficiently PAC-learnable under product distributions [29]. It may be
possible to look into other venues where SMW and SAW hierarchies are applicable.
There are also a few technical questions to be answered:
• Does MPH-(d+ 1) — which subsumes SD-d — include all SMW-d functions?
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• Can we improve the SAW-based efficiency characterization of of Single-bid Auction and SIA to O(d)?
• Can the MPH hierarchy be used to characterize constrained set function maximization?
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